Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Come, Lazarus!


Monday, February 22, 2010

My first Cartography project using Photoshop

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Japan's Atomic Fate

Written and researched by Michael O'Bannon. Copyright 2004.


On August 6, 1945, a new bomb exploded over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. This new weapon was of such great destructive force that the population of the city was cut in half in mere seconds (United States 23). Many more died later on from unexpected radiation effects left in the bomb's wake.

One single bomb from one single plane could now inflict the same amount of damage as 220 B-29s carrying over 1,600 tons of incendiary and high explosive bombs (United States 24). So utter was the carnage that in what was once a sprawling industrial metropolis of over 300,000, only three buildings were left standing (Kase 213).

This single weapon was developed and used by the United States near the end of World War II to bring Japan to her knees. It was the first atomic attack in history, with a second closely following, as the bomb hit the city of Nagasaki on August 9. World War II officially ended on August 14, after a Japanese surrender. Circumstances seem to point that, obviously, the atomic bomb was the decisive factor in winning the war, and that by employing its use, the United States averted a long and bloody invasion of Japan.

There is now, however, clear evidence that shows Japan, crippled as it was, would have surrendered even without an atomic attack. There is even evidence that shows that, in all probability, Japan could have surrendered prior to August, yet a set of political and ideological circumstances steamrolled through any attempt for peace until after the atomic deployment. The United States, by a failure to define "unconditional surrender" until after Nagasaki, and by a well-documented postwar political agenda, may have actually prolonged World War II.

The officials of the United States, from President Harry Truman down, justified the use of the atomic bomb by stating it saved the Allied forces from a hellish invasion of Japan that would have, no doubt, cost many men and resources and would have stretched the war into 1946. The Secretary of State, James Byrnes, summarized the administration's opinion in a later book, Speaking Frankly. "Certainly, by bringing the war to an end, the atomic bomb saved the lives of thousands of American boys." (Byrnes 264).

The end of the war, whether caused by the atomic bomb or not, did obliterate any need for an invasion, and therefore, saved lives. There is, however, fiction mingled in with that fact. Historian William Lanouette, in "Why We Dropped the Bomb", stated that as "questions were raised after the war" over the need for atomic attacks, "administration officials cited higher and higher casualty figures to justify their decision." (31).

President Truman, months after the end of the war, declared that "a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood were worth a couple Japanese cities." Yet in his Memoirs, published in 1955, Truman doubled that figure and estimated that over 500,000 American lives were saved by not invading Japan and British Prime Minister Churchill, who hailed the bomb as a "miracle of deliverance" declared that it saved over a million (Lanouette 31).

Of course, based on these appalling figures, the Allied statements after the war seemed to have merit and to justify their decision. The number of actual casualties estimated in an invasion of Japan, however, was far, far less than the exaggerations given in hindsight.

United States Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, informed President Truman quite early in the spring of 1945 that an assault on the island of Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, would not exceed 31,000 casualties in the first and most brutal month. The subsequent Operation Coronet, an invasion of the Japanese main island of Honshu, would bring the total dead to about 40,000 (Alperovitz, Why 24). The losses estimated by the U.S. military, while still staggering, came nowhere near a quarter of a million.

Any invasion, according to later intelligence studies, was only a "remote possibility" (Alperovitz, Historians 16). Even without the atomic bombing on August 6, the "U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey" Summary Report concluded that Japan would have surrendered "even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." (26). The state of Japan's forces in the spring and summer of 1945 was very poor, and the "top U.S. officials knew it." (Alperovitz, Why 22). An invasion, in the face of an already defeated Japanese military, was unlikely. Japan was desperate, and, at that time, was seeking a peaceful way out.

The Joint Intelligence Committee, an advisory group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported on April 29 that more and more Japanese civilians and military personnel were beginning to understand they were defeated. "Once the Japanese people, as well as their leaders, were persuaded both that absolute defeat was inevitable and that unconditional surrender did not imply national annihilation, surrender might follow fairly quickly." (Alperovitz, Historians 20). Such a sense of defeat was spreading throughout Japan in the spring of 1945, as Japan's military was battered and broken at Iwo Jima and Okinawa (Lanouette, 37). American Admiral William Leahy summarized the Japanese situation. "The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons." (Leahy 441).

"The Japanese fleet has been reduced to practical impotency" declared Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur. "The Japanese Air Force has been reduced to a line of action which involves uncoordinated, suicidal attacks against our forces." (Alperovitz, Why 24). Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, agreed with that summation. In his words, the Japanese navy had ‚"practically ceased to exist." (Stimson 618). Stimson also pointed out Japan's clear vulnerability to blockade and "concentrated air attacks." (Strauss 186). Japan lost the war, according to Fleet Admiral Ernest King, because of the "relentlessly effective surface and submarine blockade and our carrier-based air attacks." (Strauss 187).

The Japanese Navy was in extremely poor condition. Out of 12 battleships, 11 were sunk. Out of 26 carriers, 20 were at the bottom of the ocean and 38 out of 43 cruisers were likewise destroyed. "The few ships that remained afloat were for the most part so heavily damaged as to be of no military value" declared Admiral King (Strauss 186). In the month of July alone, Admiral Halsey's command destroyed or damaged 2,804 planes, 148 combat ships, and 1598 merchant ships (Strauss 187). Shigenori Togo, the Japanese foreign minister, admitted the dire situation of Japan's ability to continue the war effort in Cause of Japan. "Production decreased drastically, on account of the air attacks and the breakdown of transportation facilities." Not only did production of aircraft dwindle, but even "salt, essential to the manufacture of explosives, became scarce." (300). It was clear to the United States by mid-June that an invasion would not even be necessary. Secretary Stimson noted in July that the U.S. forces "should be able to inflict enormously severe damage on the Japanese homeland by the combined application of 'conventional' sea and air power." (Stimson 619). Japan's deteriorated military strength was so severe that the Strategic Bombing Survey stated that "even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion." (26).

To many military commanders, Japan's situation was obvious. Fleet Admiral Nimitz was confident that the American Navy's attacking of Japan "with complete immunity" could bring surrender (Strauss 187). "The Japanese were already on the verge of collapse" stated General Henry Arnold, Commander of the United States Army Air Forces (Alperovitz, Historians 22). Based on this fact, other prominent leaders, such as Admiral Leahy and General Eisenhower, voiced their dissent over the atomic attacks (Alperovitz, Why 27).

A top-secret War Department study conducted in April of 1946, made the point that Japan had been willing to surrender in the summer, but was just waiting for something to convince the militarist group that Japan was defeated (Alperovitz, Historians 16). A large part of Japan's cabinet was ready for peace. As early as May 12, Truman learned of an intercepted Japanese message, attempting to secure mediation for peace through Switzerland (Alperovitz, Why 25). Another intercepted cable, on July 12, told of Emperor Hirohito's decision to intervene for peace (Alperovitz, Historians 17). The following day, the United States first became aware of Japan's pleas to Russia to help secure a diplomatic end to the war (Strauss 188). Such evidence indicates that President Truman and his officials were not ignorant of the desperation of Japan, but the lack of action demonstrates that the United States ignored it.

In his Memoirs, President Truman stated that he "never had any doubt that it [the bomb] should be used." (Truman 419). That the United States was so confident that the atomic bomb would be employed gives a hint as to why Japan's attempts at peace and crippled military forces were largely ignored. Secretary Stimson, after the war, worried that "history might find the United States, by its delay in stating its position [on surrender terms], had prolonged the war." (Stimson 629).

"That saving lives was not the highest priority seems obvious from the choices made in July," Alperovitz claims (Historians 22). Such a blunt statement is not without its evidence.

President Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, who stayed on for a few months after the swearing in of Truman, suggested in late May to clarify the terms of surrender, "an act that, if done, may have ended the war much sooner." In the period between Grew's initial suggestion and the final surrender on August 14, thousands of American soldiers died (Alperovitz, Historians 22). After meeting with Grew, President Truman said that an alteration of the terms to provide assurances that the Japanese emperor would not be taken out of power was a "sound idea" (Truman 416). The official surrender terms given to the Japanese on July 26, however, "made no mention of the Japanese emperor." (Stimson 625).

The importance of the retainment of Hirohito was great. The Japanese people considered their emperor to be a deity and without assurances of his safety, would like fight to the bitter end (Alperovitz, Historians 25). William Donovan, of the Office of Strategic Services, declared that "one of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor." (Alperovitz, Why 25). Many top officials, including Secretary Grew and Donovan, knew that a clearer definition of "unconditional surrender" was necessary. General Marshall of the Joint Chiefs recommended to President Truman that the Allied dictate not indicate that "unconditional surrender" did not mean dethronement of Hirohito (Alperovitz, Historians 18). Secretary Grew, a former ambassador to Japan, understood this point in the best sense. "Regardless of military defeat" it was unlikely that surrender would occur without some kind of provision for the Emperor (Grew 1421). When Grew, Secretary Stimson, and Navy Secretary Forrestal wrote the surrender terms on July 2, they included such provisions: "I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance." (Stimson 623). So why, when the Potsdam ultimatum followed the July 2 proposal so closely, did it leave out anything about Hirohito?

Despite the widespread agreement among high officials, Secretary Grew and those who favored provisions for the Emperor were accused as being appeasers (Stimson 626). In the face of political ridicule, however, it was not until July, when Truman's own appointed Secretary of State, James Byrnes, replaced Grew, that the focus changed. Almost immediately, diplomatic terms became less important compared with domestic affairs and U.S.-Soviet postwar relations (Lanouette 36). After the first atomic test was a success, Secretary Brynes persuaded Truman to leave out any guarantee of the monarchy (Lanouette 32). Unfortunately, as Shigenori Togo stated, "the only condition as such which we should hold out for was that of the inviolability of the imperial house." (Togo 317). Any such assurance was not given until after both atomic bombs had been dropped. It was not until that point that Secretary Stimson, making it clear that only the Emperor had the authority to command the military to lay down its weapons, convinced Truman. On August 10, Japan finally got what they had been looking for all along: a promise of Hirohito's safety. McGeorge Bundy, a collaborator of Stimson's autobiography, put it succinctly. "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war." (Stimson 628).

Yet, why, with such obvious evidence and opinion available to the United States, did it delay such an "exposition?" Domestic politics and Russian relations played a drastic role in the decision to use the atomic bomb.

In mid-June, General Marshall pointed out that the shock of a Soviet declaration against Japan could be enough to convince them of defeat. "So important did the Russian declaration seem before the first atomic test that Truman told several people it was his main reason for traveling to Potsdam, Germany, to meet with Stalin in July." (Alperovitz, Why 26).

The successful test of the atomic bomb changed everything. No longer did the United States need to rely on Russia for shock; it had its own psychological weaponry now at hand (Alperovitz, Why 27). "It had to be used against an enemy target," insisted Truman (Truman 419). While the U.S. initially planned to use the bomb in conjunction with an invasion, the need for invasion by August had dwindled to near nothing (Alperovitz, Why 26). The atomic bomb, however, would still have to be used.

The Manhattan Project, responsible for the making of the bomb, consumed over 2 billion dollars through the course of its research and production (26 billion in today's standards). It employed more than 160,000 workers in 37 top-secret factories and labs nationwide (Lanouette 34). General Leslie Groves, the military officer directly in charge of the project, emphasized the expenditure. "Our work was extremely costly, both in money and in its interference with the rest of the war effort." (Groves 265). As early as March, when James Byrnes, then an advisor, learned of the work being done, he warned President Roosevelt that political scandal might follow if the bomb was not used (Lanouette 35). It is extremely likely that Brynes made a similar claim to Truman when he took power. In fact, Truman's meeting with Russian leader Joseph Stalin was pushed back to July in order to coincide with the atomic test. "We shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now," declared Secretary Stimson (Alperovitz, Why 29). While Truman first planned to meet with Stalin to secure a Soviet declaration of war (which was planned for August 10), British Prime Minister Churchill stated on July 23 that the United States did not want Russia to interfere in the war (Alperovitz, Why 28). Such a switch of diplomatic agenda could have only been tied directly to the development of the atomic bomb.

The plan for using a Soviet declaration to lever a quick Japanese surrender, a plan of the Allies early in the summer, was rejected later on largely because of concerns about the future balance of power in Asia. The United States and Britain wanted to avoid another postwar Europe, where the power struggle with Russia was extremely heated. If the Russians engaged the Japanese, they would do so in Manchuria and Northern China, putting them in a clear position to dominate those territories after the war. Secretary Byrnes was dismayed by this possibility. According to Navy Secretary Forrestal, Byrnes was "most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in." (Alperovitz, Why 28). He was also extremely interested in how long an American atomic monopoly might last and vehemently opposed the suggestion that the Russians should be shown a test before the bomb's use (Alperovitz, Why 29). Yet no other account illustrates Byrnes's intentions for the bomb better than his statement to Leo Szilard, an atomic scientist. "Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war." Mr. Byrnes's "view [was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe." (Alperovitz, Historians 31). Truman seemed to share Byrnes's view: "If it explodes, as I think it will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." (Alperovitz, Historians 31).

"When Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor," stated British General Sir Hasting Ismay (Alperovitz, Why 26). No better prediction of the future could have existed. On August 10, the Soviets officially entered the war, just as was agreed during the Potsdam Conference. The invasion of Manchuria cut the Kwantung army, one of Japan's most elite forces, to shreds. Japanese diplomat Toshikazu Kase summarized the effect this had in Journey to the Missouri. "The massed invasion of Manchuria by the Red Army was impossible to hide from the people. The glacial avalanche from the north stunned GHQ [General Headquarters]. They knew that the game was up." (214). The Russian entry came only a day after the atomic attack on Nagasaki. The deadlocked Japanese cabinet, through a direct intervention by Emperor Hirohito, finally accepted the Potsdam terms, with the condition that the Emperor would stay. On August 14, the peace was made.

In the spring and summer of 1945, it was clear that Japan was militarily defeated. It was becoming even clearer that an Allied invasion would not be necessary to win the war. It was known that Japan was trying to mediate for peace, and it was known that a Russian declaration of war could be just what the Allies needed to end the Pacific conflict. The terms of surrender were kept vague up until the final moment and postwar diplomacy with Russia obviously played a role in the decision to use the atomic bomb. It is plain that the atomic bomb was not necessary to end World War II, and despite later statements of justification, apparently did not save any more American lives. It, through the prolonging of the war, even cost a few. Yet the political momentum of the wartime diplomatic machinery seemed to be enough to propel America into an atomic age, yet with all of the facts laid bare, we must ask the question: Was it worth it?


Alperovitz, Gar. "Hiroshima: Historians Reassess." Foreign Policy. Summer 1995: 15-
35. Academic Search Premier. UMD Net. 17 February 2004.

Alperovitz, Gar. "Why the United States Dropped the Bomb." Technology Review Aug/Sep. 1990: 22-35. Academic Search Premier. UMD Net. 17 February 2004.

Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper, 1947.

Grew, Joseph C. Turbulent Era. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. Vol. 2. 2 vols.

Groves, Leslie. Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project. New York: Harper, 1961.

Kase, Toshikasu. Journey to the Missouri. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Lanouette, William. "Why We Dropped the Bomb." Civilization Jan/Feb. 1995: 28-
38. Academic Search Premier. UMD Net. 17 February 2004.

Leahy, William. I Was There. New York: Whittlesey House-McGraw-Hill, 1950.

Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper, 1947.

Strauss, Lewis. Men and Decisions. New York: Doubleday, 1962.

Togo, Shigenori. The Cause of Japan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956.

Truman, Harry S. Year of Decisions. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955. Vol. 1 of Memoirs. 2 vols.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Summary Report (Pacific War). Washington: GPO, 1946.

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Saturday, April 19, 2008

Composition No. 15

Composition No. 15

Composition No. 15

Composition No. 14

Composition No. 14A

Alternate Version: Composition No. 14B

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

Rarity in Judgment

Copyright: 2007 Michael Riordan O'Bannon

Tuesday, December 5, 2006

The Death of Mr. Hyde

The time has come to reveal everything, to pull back the curtain. Instead of finding a little old man is really the powerful Wizard of Oz, however, the image I wish to produce is quite the opposite. What you've seen to be a little old man melts away and the Wizard of Oz shows himself in his true glory.

Sunday, December 3, 2006

Change Your Heart

The following is a series of text messages I sent to my ex-girlfriend within the past two days. None of them have been edited and no messages have been omitted. Every one of these messages are sent from me to her. She did not respond during this entire period.

December 2

9:14 AM - I feel like an asshole
for being unable to believe you for your word. However, openness, honesty, and your ability to keep your promises have been lacking...

9:22 AM - You just don't understand the amount of pain I've suffered at your hands. And you don't understand me or my motives to respond, to question, to fear, to despair.

5:59 PM - You've missed something very fundamental about my character. And the tragedy of it all is how desperately I wanted you to see it...

December 3

12:38 AM - And sweet. I am back to being ignored. Awesome.

3:23 AM - There are things we have both said and done, some despicable, some wonderful, which cannot be unsaid or undone...

3:26 AM - Yet we have two options nonetheless. We can forgive. Or we can forget. The pain we have caused can seldom be forgotten but may, with grace, be forgiven.

3:31 AM - The love and joy we have shared, however, without the forgiveness of our wrongs, can only be forgotten. Then they become as if they never were.

3:27 AM - My gift is that of forgiveness, my curse one of remembrance. That is where the true pain lies: in the memory of what was that can never be so again.

6:19 AM - I find it easy to forgive your words and actions, all the lies, deceit, infidelity, disrespect, and resentment. I find it easy, however disappointed I may be.

6:24 AM - Because I am the one who pushed you to do, say, and feel those things. By my actions, I manifested exactly what I expected but, ironically, was my greatest fear.

6:28 AM - I needed to know how real your feelings were, how steadfast your promises could be. To what lengths and depths your love for me, me at my very worst, truly were.

6:34 AM - I know it may be hard to understand what I am saying. And if you do, you are perfectly justified in feeling revulsion...I am truly sorry for how I am.

6:40 AM - In the process of pushing the envelope ever further, I not only hurt you but I was forced to accept my own condemnation and self-hatred, risking too much.

6:45 AM - Because I risked losing you. I risked my stability, my independence, an entire life of events I strive for and desired to share with you.

6:49 AM - I destroyed my dream and I manipulated you into helping me turn it all to dust...though I wished you had held firm. I was desperate that you would.

6:53 AM - And so now I mourn the promising future that I pointlessly killed...and I despise myself for it and I am afraid of what I am able to allow myself to become.

6:57 AM - You don't have to forgive me for all the heartache I knowingly caused...I just ask that you remember me for what I was in the beginning and not what I ended as.

7:03 AM - I love you. I love you more than any other, living or dead, present or past. And for that reason, not out of egoistical or self-serving ideas, I regret it all.

7:06 AM - I could have remained the man you were drawn to, the man you fell in love with. I could have surpassed him. But I didn't. I forced myself to bury that man.

7:09 AM - And you deserve so much better than what I sickly perverted myself into. You deserve better.

10:32 AM - "Change your heart, look around you. Change your heart, it will astound you. I need your lovin', like the sunshine...but everybody's gotta learn sometimes..."

3:28 PM - Any response from you more than responding by ignoring my messages...would really mean a lot to me. I opened a gaping hole in my emotional security...

3:34 PM - It took a lot out of me to admit all of that to your cold silence is making me feel like you think it unimportant, the ramblings of an ill mind...

3:38 PM - I started this series of texts more than 24 hours ago, probably the most texting I've done in so short a time, yet every one has gone unanswered.

3:42 PM - I know you have checked your phone during all that time, I know you are aware of at least portions of my confessions...

3:47 PM - And it feels cruel to me, to willingly leave me prostrated, imprisoned in silence, denied evidence that what I said matters in any way to you...

3:54 PM - I have no choice but to assume your deaf ear means that I have misplaced my emotions I will leave you to move on. I will allow you to forget.

3:56 PM - I love you. And I'm sorry. Goodbye, Lady...

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Facebook Sucks My Foreskin

Michael O'Bannon's Facebook profile

Tuesday, September 19, 2006

Thursday, September 7, 2006

How Goes the Flow?

As always: Downhill.

So it looks like things in my life have shifted once again. I will destroy the life I knew and begin fresh one more time. I don't know if I have what it takes.

Well, that's not true. I know I have what it takes. I just know I don't want to give it. I'm at the bottom of a dry pit without the will to crawl and tear myself out again. I have no reason to do that, I've lost and squandered and wasted all my reasons, so I'm left with sheer principle.

When I have tried so ridiculously to frame my life around principle, I fail now in desperate self-destruction. Is it easier to die, starving and alone, in this hole?

I'll find out.

Sunday, September 3, 2006

Fucking Whore

Okay, I'm really upset right now. In fact, I have been rather violently angry ever since I woke up last night at around midnight only to find myself in an empty apartment. Sarah, who I now refer to as my pseudo-ex-girlfriend (as she still, after two weeks, has either not decided whether or not she and I are going to stay together or whether or not she and I will break up for good, or, more likely, she has decided which option she wants but simply is too much of a selfish slut bag to let me know), apparently went to hang out with her friend Elizabeth, who goes to college in a neighboring town. She went there and would be staying the night.

This she told me when I texted her after waking up asking where she was. "Sorry I didn't leave a note, I thought you were out for the night." Who gives a fuck? Leave a note anyway. If you are going to leave suddenly, take the car, and imprison me within this apartment, all just to spend the night with the biggest cock whore I have ever met (yes, including my ex-girlfriend Allie) that is now a reefer head in addition, it doesn't matter if you think I'm going to be sleeping until you return home. If, by some miracle of circumstance, I don't sleep more than 18 hours and actually get up wondering what the fuck is going on, write a note. Just, ya know, in case. And why the fuck would she want to "spend the night" in some shit ass cramped dorm or campus apartment, anyway? Because she went there to get drunk and high and suck dick, that's why. And the reason she isn't back home yet, even though it's nearly noon, is not because she enjoys sleeping in in unfamiliar places with unfamiliar people around her, it's because she's fucking hung over and feels too tired/sick to make the 20 minute drive back. I try calling her to figure out exactly what the fuck she's doing but she doesn't pick up her phone. Ever. Not for me, that is. Anyone else, she'll rush to pull herself off my cock in the middle of a sexual frenzy just because her fucking cell phone rings.

Besides all of that, she shut the fucking cat in the bathroom. And our cat enjoys opening up drawers and cupboards and eating paper and being a fucking pain in the ass. So, when I got up out of bed and really needed to take a leak, I can't get into the goddam bathroom because the cat has pulled open a drawer right in front of the door. I try and try, using a rod and a coat hanger, for nearly half an hour to push this fucking drawer back in so I can get the door open and finally empty my bladder, but no dice. So, what options do I have? Especially after Sarah's annoying disregard for the fact that I still care about her and want to be with her and I'm ready to start packing up everything I own and take a dump on the floor with a note attached saying, "Was fun, but in the end this is what being with you was worth to me."?

I bashed the bathroom door down. It snapped into three pieces after I rammed my shoulder into it about a dozen times. I got to see how the outside of it is wood but inside there's nothing but cardboard. This would explain why I was able to so easily destroy the bathroom door without injuring myself in any way.

So now the door sits, in its perfect trinity-like state of destruction, on the living room floor behind the couch. Now, we have no bathroom door. And I'll be fucking pissed when Sarah tells me to swap the laundry room door and put it on the bathroom, which I know she will demand, as well as I will be pissed when she gets bitchy and probably tells me I need to pay for it or move out of something a snobby bitch like her would tell me when she's the fucking idiot who left the cat locked in there.

And now I have no more cigarettes. I haven't had a smoke in nearly four hours and I'm starting to get the itch. I'm starting to feel like causing some bloodshed. I want a fucking cigarette.

But, the ho took the car. The ho left me with the only the money that was currently in my pockets: $2.95. The ho answered her phone (finally) about half an hour ago and when I asked when she would be back she just said, "In a while. Can I go back to sleep now?"

"Wait, what?" (the "what" being more of a "why" as in "why the fuck are you sleeping past noon over at Elizabeth's")

"I was sleeping."


The bitch hung up on me. So she could sleep off her booze/weed/cum filled coma. Meanwhile I don't have the means or money to even get a pack of cigarettes to smoke away my stress at this obviously fucked up situation.

Well, things will not be pretty when she does come back.

What the fuck do I care, anyway? She slobbered all over another dude's cock a few hours after she kissed me and told me she loved me. She broke up with me and fucking broke my heart, listened to me plead to her, listened to me profess my deepest feelings to her, all while she kept her tonguing that prick's tool the night before her little secret. I didn't even get the decency of her telling me about it even after that. No, I found out about it because I know her fucking internet passwords and read her messages.

She still tells me she loves me. She still wants me to cuddle her and rub her and kiss her goodnight, even though (yes, once again because I read through her messages) she has no intention of getting back together with me.

Well, what the fuck do I care about her shitty bathroom door? I should ram my shoulder into the cunt's face a dozen times, rather than have to snap apart the bathroom door like that. The relationship is over, despite how much effort and determination I put into it. She can fucking go to hell.

I just want a motherfucking cigarette, for fuck's sake!